Three Times Unlucky For Rio .

Bad things happen in threes, the superstitious say. It's just as well for Rio Tinto Chief Executive Tom Albanese for whom a fourth piece of bad news might be that he's lost shareholders' patience.

Rio and its mining-industry rival BHP Billiton have abandoned a $116 billion iron-ore joint venture in Western Australia. It's the third time in as many years that the company's proposed a transformational deal, only for it to go sour.

Consider its too-generous $38.1 billion acquisition of U.S. aluminum producer Alcan in 2007. The bid loaded Rio's balance sheet with debt just as the global financial crisis—and ensuing slump in aluminum prices—approached. The mining giant earmarked $10 billion of asset disposals to help pay off the loans, only to find the pool of buyers dry up.

That led to stumble number two. Seeking other sources of capital, it agreed to sell a $19.5 billion stake to Aluminum Corp. of China, or Chinalco. The move riled U.K. shareholders who recognized their cherished pre-emption rights would be trampled, while investors also worried that Chinalco, a key customer, would influence decision-making at Rio. The deal was eventually scrapped.

The collapse of the joint venture with BHP—which promised $10 billion in cost savings—makes three. If Mr. Albanese survives this setback, that'll come down to the improvement in commodities markets rather than his own performance. Iron ore prices have nearly doubled in the past year, raising earnings and bringing down the company's debt.

Mr. Albanese also has a ready made scapegoat for the joint venture's collapse in regulators in major iron-ore consuming countries, who worried it would further concentrate the world's ore output in the hands of only three major players. Meanwhile, more than half of the $10 billion cost savings that Rio hoped to get from the joint venture may still flow through less formal cooperation with BHP in areas such as access to rail links and blending of ores.

All of the above should blunt calls for Mr. Albanese's head.

While Rio may be unapologetic about pursuing deals as big as the project with BHP on the grounds that they suited market conditions at the time, it is at pains to show it has learnt lessons from their collapse. Its latest spending plans, $13 billion worth, will focus on growing existing assets such as the Simandou iron ore deposit in Guinea and the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold mine in Mongolia.

Make a success of those multi billion dollar investments and Albanese will discover that even the most implacable investors are willing to forgive and forget.

　　Bad things happen in threes, the superstitious say. It's just as well for Rio Tinto Chief Executive Tom Albanese for whom a fourth piece of bad news might be that he's lost shareholders' patience.

　　Rio and its mining-industry rival BHP Billiton have abandoned a $116 billion iron-ore joint venture in Western Australia. It's the third time in as many years that the company's proposed a transformational deal, only for it to go sour.

　　Consider its too-generous $38.1 billion acquisition of U.S. aluminum producer Alcan in 2007. The bid loaded Rio's balance sheet with debt just as the global financial crisis—and ensuing slump in aluminum prices—approached. The mining giant earmarked $10 billion of asset disposals to help pay off the loans, only to find the pool of buyers dry up.

　　That led to stumble number two. Seeking other sources of capital, it agreed to sell a $19.5 billion stake to Aluminum Corp. of China, or Chinalco. The move riled U.K. shareholders who recognized their cherished pre-emption rights would be trampled, while investors also worried that Chinalco, a key customer, would influence decision-making at Rio. The deal was eventually scrapped.

　　The collapse of the joint venture with BHP—which promised $10 billion in cost savings—makes three. If Mr. Albanese survives this setback, that'll come down to the improvement in commodities markets rather than his own performance. Iron ore prices have nearly doubled in the past year, raising earnings and bringing down the company's debt.

　　Mr. Albanese also has a ready made scapegoat for the joint venture's collapse in regulators in major iron-ore consuming countries, who worried it would further concentrate the world's ore output in the hands of only three major players. Meanwhile, more than half of the $10 billion cost savings that Rio hoped to get from the joint venture may still flow through less formal cooperation with BHP in areas such as access to rail links and blending of ores.

　　All of the above should blunt calls for Mr. Albanese's head.

　　While Rio may be unapologetic about pursuing deals as big as the project with BHP on the grounds that they suited market conditions at the time, it is at pains to show it has learnt lessons from their collapse. Its latest spending plans, $13 billion worth, will focus on growing existing assets such as the Simandou iron ore deposit in Guinea and the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold mine in Mongolia.

　　Make a success of those multi billion dollar investments and Albanese will discover that even the most implacable investors are willing to forgive and forget.